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DEFINING A SINGLE ENTITY FOR PURPOSES OF
SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT POST
COPPERWELD: A SUGGESTED APPROACHt
Section I of the Sherman Act proscribes joint activity between in-
dependent business entities that restrains trade. The Supreme
Court has traditionally held that parents and subsidiaries are in-
dependent entities capable of violating section 1. These holdings,
much criticized by commentators, created the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine. Recently, the Court reconsidered the doctrine
and ruled that a parent and wholly owned subsidiary were a single
entity and were, therefore, incapable of violating section 1. This
Comment briefly examines the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine, examines the various approaches used by the circuits to de-
termine when affiliated corporations should be considered a single
entity, and evaluates two possible alternatives to these tests. Fi-
nally, a new approach is proposed which would provide a mean-
ingful alternative to the tests currently used by the circuits.
INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contract[s], combina-
tion[s], . or conspirac[ies]" that restrain trade.1 These prohibited
activities require at least two persons or entities.2 Antitrust litigation
often involves the issue of whether affiliated corporations 3 constitute
t The author would like to thank his parents for their unending support and
encouragement and Professor Ralph H. Folsom for his advice and assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2. Id. at § 8. "Section 1 can be violated only by two [or more] separate entities
acting in concert, by a 'contract, combination, or conspiracy' in restraint of trade." L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 108, at 311 (1977).
3. An affiliate is a corporation directly or indirectly related to one or more other
corporations by stockholding or other means of control. The term includes not only a
parent or a subsidiary, but also firms related by a smaller percentage of ownership. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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a single entity or multiple entities for antitrust enforcement pur-
poses. Determining the definition of a single entity, which is implic-
itly excluded from section 1 liability, has been a point of dispute in
the United States over the last thirty years.4
Courts are in general agreement that the unincorporated divisions
and other internal units of one corporation comprise a single entity
and are incapable of conspiring among themselves within the scope
of section 1.5 Where the structure of a corporation is that of a par-
ent" and a subsidiary,7 however, the Supreme Court has traditionally
held that the parent and subsidiary constitute the plurality of entities
necessary to conspire within the meaning of section 1.8 The Court's
long-standing treatment of parents and subsidiaries as separate enti-
ties for section 1 purposes is known as the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine."
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opinions10 on intra-enterprise
conspiracy are quite vague and have created confusion among the
circuits in defining the doctrine's limits. As a result, the circuits have
split on the breadth they attribute to the intra-enterprise decisions of
the Court. Additionally, the tests used to determine whether affili-
ated corporations are a single entity differ dramatically among these
4. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
1325 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
5. See, e.g., H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239
(5th Cir. 1978); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
6. A parent company owns more than fifty percent of another company's shares
of voting stock. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
7. A subsidiary is a company in which another company owns at least fifty per-
cent of its shares, and thus has control. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1280 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
8. See cases cited supra note 4; see also Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581
(8th Cir. 1981); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Rogu Foods, 627 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1980);
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979); H & B Equipment Co.,
577 F.2d at 244-45; Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 579
F.2d 20, 33-34 n.49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs. Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1004 (1975).
9. For more extensive discussions of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, see
Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981); Handler, Through the Looking Glass - Twenty-First
Annual Antitrust Review 57 CALIF. L. REV. 182 (1969); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust
Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 20 (1968); McQuade,
Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L.
REV. 183 (1955); Note, "Conspiracy Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A
Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977); Comment, All in the Family: When
Will Internal Discussions be Labeled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 63
(1975); Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmaking Approach,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1732 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust
Conspiracy].
10. See cases cited supra note 4.
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courts.
Recently, the Supreme Court once again addressed the intra-en-
terprise conspiracy doctrine in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Co." In Copperweld, the Court overturned thirty-seven years
of precedent in holding that a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary
were incapable of conspiring within section 1 because they consti-
tuted a single entity. 2 The Court reasoned that, in reality, a parent
and wholly owned subsidiary always have a unity of purpose or a
common design, and that "[t] he intra-enterprise doctrine looks to the
form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the reality.'
3
It is important to note that the Court expressly limited its holding
to parents and wholly owned subsidiaries; it never considered
whether a parent and an affiliated corporation, which the parent does
not completely own, may be capable of conspiring under section 1.11
Therefore, the continued viability of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine is unsettled in affiliated corporate situations after
Copperweld.15
This Comment briefly examines the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine, examines the various tests currently used by the circuits,
and evaluates two possible alternatives to these tests. Additionally, a
new approach is suggested to determine when affiliated corporations
should be considered a single entity. This approach would provide a
meaningful alternative to the tests currently being used by the cir-
cuits, which are ill-devised efforts to define a single entity, and
should be abandoned.
The following five hypothetical business relationships will be
presented to analyze whether single or multiple entities exist for sec-
tion 1 purposes: (1) a parent corporation owns all of the stock of a
subsidiary corporation; (2) a parent corporation owns a majority of
the stock of a subsidiary corporation; (3) a corporation owns less
than a majority of the stock of another corporation, but owns a block
large enough to claim the ability to exercise effective control;' (4) a
11. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
12. Id. at 2745.
13. Id. at 2743.
14. Id. at 2740.
15. One commentator believes that in the elaborate effort of the majority to dis-
tinguish prior intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases in Copperweld, it may have in-
advertently suggested that the doctrine may retain viability, thereby creating future un-
certainty. See 6 NAT'L L.J. 22 (July 23, 1984). ,
16. For purposes of this Comment, control is constituted by all the rights and
contracts which, either separately or jointly, legally, or in practice, make it possible for
one corporation to determine how another shall operate.
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corporation owns a small percentage of the stock of another corpora-
tion but, because of widespread public holdings, is able to exercise
effective control over it; and (5) a corporation does not own any of
the stock of another corporation, but through licensing or loan agree-
ments is able to exercise effective control.
THE INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
Congress' purpose in passing the Sherman Act (the Act) was to
preserve and promote free competition.17 The premise of the Act was
that unrestrained competition produces the best allocation of re-
sources.18 The Act prohibits conduct that Congress and the courts
have identified as a significant threat to competition and distin-
guishes between concerted business conduct and unilateral, or single
firm, conduct.' 9
The least intrusive standard or regulation is applied to unilateral
activity. Such activity is subject only to section 2 of the Act, which is
violated only when the market power of a firm is such that its con-
duct would create a dangerous probability of monopolization.20 Con-
certed conduct, on the other hand, is subject to the stricter standard
of section 1, which prohibits conduct that creates unreasonable re-
straints of trade2 1 without requiring any danger of monopolization.
Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal. 22
Every "person" who makes a contract or engages in any combination
or conspiracy declared illegal by the Act is guilty of a felony.2" Sec-
tion 8 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "The word person or
persons whenever used in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed
to include corporations. ' 24 The divergence in scope between sections
1 and 2 reflects a Congressional policy decision to encourage compe-
tition by imposing a stricter standard of liability on concerted
conduct.25
17. See 21 CONG. REC. S.2456-62 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman).
18. Id.
19. Concerted business conduct is integrated activity by two or more independent
firms. Unilateral conduct is the activity of a single firm.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). A discussion of section 2 is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at § 1. Congress' determination to impose more stringent Sherman Act
sanctions on concerted conduct is consistent with the stricter punishment for multiparty
conduct as reflected in the common law treatment of conspiracies. See, e.g., United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,
593-94 (1961).
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Liability under section 1 requires at least two entities, 2  because
the provision implicitly excludes unilateral conduct. The lower courts
agree that officers and employees of the same firm do not provide the
plurality of actors required for a section 1 violation.27 The courts
also generally hold that section 1 is not violated by the internal coor-
dinated conduct of a corporation and its unincorporated divisions.2
The more difficult question is whether a parent and subsidiary can
conspire under section 1.29 Over the years, the Supreme Court
handed down a series of decisions which answered the question af-
firmatively, creating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.30 Al-
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
27. See, e.g., University Life Insurance Company of America v. Unimarc, Ltd.,
699 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1983); Tose v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879,
893-94 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Invest-
ment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981); H & B Equipment Co., 577 F.2d at 244;
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 416 F.2d at 82-84; Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464
(1962); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 913-14 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
28. See, e.g., H & B Equipment Co., 577 F.2d at 239; Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 416 F.2d at 83.
29. The first judicial recognition of the notion that there can be a conspiracy
between parents and wholly owned subsidiaries occurred in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
30. Four Supreme Court cases generally are considered to be the major intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases.
United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947), is viewed as the source of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. In that case, the government charged Morris Mar-
kin with having conducted an anti-competitive operation in which he attained ownership
and control over taxicab operations in four major cities, and then restrained trade by
requiring the operating companies to purchase their vehicles from a single manufacturer
controlled by Markin. Markin owned one hundred percent of the stock of Cab Sales and
Parts Corporation and a controlling interest in Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation
(CCM). Markin's associates controlled Checker Taxi Company. CCM held sixty-two
percent of the stock in Parmalee Transportation Company, which in turn owned a con-
trolling interest in the Chicago Yellow Cab Company and one hundred percent of several
other cab operating companies. Id. at 221-22. Markin controlled one hundred percent of
the Pittsburgh market, eighty-six percent of the Chicago Market, fifty-eight percent of
the Minneapolis market, and fifteen percent of the New York market. Id. at 224. He
attempted to avoid the charge on the grounds that they were a single business entity. The
Supreme Court upheld the charge, holding that an unlawful restraint "may result as
readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent . . . . The
corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of
the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance rather than form." Id. at 227.
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), involved a
new type of intra-enterprise conspiracy. There, both of the parent's manufacturing sub-
sidiaries refused to deal with a wholesale purchaser who would not sell their products
below a maximum price set by the parent. Id. at 212. The Court held that the subsidiar-
ies had entered into an illegal conspiracy to fix prices. It rejected the defendant's claim
1249
though the gist of these holdings is that separate incorporation alone
establishes separate entities capable of violating section 1, the Court
has never clearly defined the confines of the doctrine. 31 Notably, the
doctrine has been much criticized by commentators.32
INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE IN THE CIRCUITS
Without guidance by the Supreme Court as to what limitations, if
any, there should be on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, con-
fusion ensued among the circuits. They split on the weight to be
given to the Court's intra-enterprise conspiracy decisions. Accord-
ingly, divergent decisions have been rendered with respect to what
constitutes a single entity, and corporations have been held to incon-
sistent standards. Some circuits reached a formalistic conclusion by
reading the precedents literally and holding that separate incorpora-
tion, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish that a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary are separate entities capable of conspir-
ing.33 On the other hand, a few circuits attempted to narrow and
that "their status as mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising unit
makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman
Act." Id. at 215. The Court stated that "this suggestion runs counter to our past deci-
sions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact
of the antitrust laws." Id. Without elaboration, the Court added "[tihe rule is especially
applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors." Id.
Kiefer-Stewart was followed later the same year by Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The defendant was charged with conspiring with its
two partly-owned foreign subsidiaries to restrain trade in the worldwide market for ball
bearings. The American company owned thirty percent of an English company and fifty
percent of a French company. The three divided territories among themselves and fixed
prices of products that one sold in the territory of another. Id. at 595-96. The Court
repeated its view that "common ownership or control of the contracting parties does not
liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws." Id. at 598. Justice Jackson, in his
dissent, viewed the holding of the majority as rendering such agreements between a par-
ent and subsidiary illegal even though the parent could legally accomplish the same goals
by acting alone. Id. at 606 (Jackson, J., dissenting). He stated that this result "places too
much weight on labels," and concluded that "this decision will restrain more trade than
it will make free." Id. at 606-08.
Finally, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968), several franchise dealers brought a private action against Midas, Inc., its parent
corporation International Parts Corporation, two other International subsidiaries, and six
individuals. Id. at 135. The plaintiffs challenged as a conspiracy to restrain trade the
franchise agreements, which required the franchisees to purchase all of their muffler and
exhaust systems from International's marketing subsidiary. Id. at 137. The Court found*
for the plaintiffs, stating only that the defendants had "availed themselves of the privi-
lege of doing business through separate corporations, [and] the fact of common owner-
ship could not save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities." Id. at 141-42.
31. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739 (noting that the justifications and conse-
quences for such a doctrine have never been explored or analyzed).
32. See authorities cited supra note 9.
33. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co., 579 F.2d at 33-34 n.49; H & B
Equipment Co., 577 F.2d at 244-45; George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., 508 F.2d at 557. But
see White v. Hearst Corp., 669 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1982); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavi-
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define the doctrine's scope through limiting tests or rules,34 which
define a single entity in a more economic sense. Although several
rules have been advanced, efforts to temper the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine have been largely unsuccessful.3 5 The employment
of divergent tests by the circuits illustrates their inability to develop
a definition of a single entity that is sound in both principle and
practice.
Commentators point to five tests or rules adopted by the circuits to
either implement or restrict the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
They are generally referred to as: (1) the absolute rule; (2) the hold-
ing out as competitors rule; (3) the sole decision-maker rule; (4) the
third party restraint test; and (5) the all the facts test.
The Absolute Rule
The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits have employed the so-called
absolute rule. These circuits hold that separate incorporation is suffi-
cient to support a ruling that related corporations are capable of con-
spiring in violation of section 1.36 Under this rule, defendant corpo-
rations are not allowed to defend on the ground that they are a
single enterprise and therefore beyond the ambit of section 1.37
These circuits apply the Supreme Court decisions literally and do
not attempt to limit the application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine.38
This literal, inflexible approach was used in H & B Equipment
Co. v. International Harvester.39 In this case, commenced by a ter-
minated dealer against International Harvester and its subsidiary,
the court stated: "The parent's choice of form is important. Having
availed itself of separate incorporation for [the subsidiary], [the par-
ent] marked it off as a distinct entity, and the antitrust laws treat it
tron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972).
34. An example of such a standard is the "all the facts" test used by the Seventh,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Ogilvie, 641 F.2d at 581; Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.,
627 F.2d at 419; Photovest Corp., 606 F.2d at 704.
35. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 681 (arguing that vague rules were resulting
in more litigation and actually deterring desirable behavior).
36. Courts using this rule read the Supreme Court opinions literally and find that
a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary are always capable of conspiracy. They reason
that the broad language of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases leave them no
room to maneuver; they must therefore conclude that separate incorporation creates sep-
arate entities. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., 508 F.2d at 557.
37. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 40.
38. Id.
39. 577 F.2d at 239.
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as such."140
The absolute rule is the approach most often criticized by com-
mentators,4 ' who focus primarily on its use of form over substance.42
This criticism appears to have merit when one considers that a par-
ent of a wholly owned subsidiary could easily reorganize its subsidi-
ary into an unincorporated division and, by this formality, avoid sec-
tion 1 liability. In fact, Seagram used this solution after the adverse
holding in Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 41 In
the Kiefer-Stewart case, two wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagram
refused to sell their products to the plaintiff, a wholesale liquor
dealer, who continuously violated a maximum price ceiling set by the
parent. The Supreme Court ruled that the subsidiaries violated sec-
tion 1 by entering into an illegal conspiracy to fix prices. 44 By reor-
ganizing its subsidiaries into divisions, the corporation was subse-
quently able to avoid liability in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hawaiian Oke and Liquors.4 Although the district court found that
the divisions were, in substance, the same entities that existed at the
time of the Kiefer-Stewart decision, the circuit court found no sec-
tion 1 violation because the divisions were components of a single
entity.46
This decision not only demonstrates how the absolute rule pro-
motes form over substance, it also shows how the rule artificially dis-
courages subsidiary formation by penalizing separate incorporation
with section 1 liability exposure. 7 Further, the case discloses how
susceptible the rule is to manipulation 8 by defendants intent on
avoiding antitrust liability.49
The Holding Out As Competitors Rule
In an effort to limit the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, some
circuits have adopted a holding out as competitors test.50 This test
40. Id. at 245.
41. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 44; Note, supra note 9, at 667-
63; Comment, Intra-enterprise Antitrust Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1745.
42. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 44.
43. 340 U.S. at 211.
44. Id. at 215. For further discussion of Kiefer-Stewart, see supra note 30.
45. 416 F.2d at 71.
46. Id. at 73.
47. See, Note, supra note 9, at 666; Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspir-
acy, supra note 9, at 1745.
48. For further discussion on this point, see Comment, Intra-enterprise Antitrust
Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1745-46.
49. Commentators have also criticized the absolute rule because it allows private
plaintiffs to attack essentially unilateral behavior under section 1 which, for lack of dan-
ger of monopolization, fails to meet the threshold requirement of section 2.
50. See, e.g., J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d 787, 793 (5th
Cir. 1983); Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1043-44,
1046 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 572-73 (D.
1252
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limits section 1 liability to those instances where the affiliated corpo-
rate defendants have held themselves out as competitors. Circuits us-
ing this approach have focused on the Supreme Court's statement in
Kiefer-Stewart that "[t]he rule [common ownership does not relieve
section 1 liability] is especially applicable where . . . [corporations]
hold themselves out as competitors." 51 Although some commentators
regard such a containment of the doctrine with favor, they acknowl-
edge that the test is quite unpredictable because the courts have
failed to precisely delineate what type of activity constitutes holding
out.52 Furthermore, no court has explained why section 1 liability
should turn on whether related corporations hold themselves out as
competitors. 53
The Sole Decision-Maker Rule
Other courts employ the sole decision-maker rule, which presumes
that, when one person owns, controls, and makes decisions for sepa-
rate corporations, the organizations are incapable of conspiring be-
cause a person is unable to conspire with himself.54 This rule was
used in Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc.55 The defendants,
Fearless Farris Wholesale and five separately incorporated retail
gasoline stations, were all owned by one person. The defendants were
alleged to have violated section 1 by refusing to supply plaintiffs with
gasoline. The Ninth Circuit ruled that, because the sole owner was
the only decision-maker, "no meeting of two or more minds [had]
occurred. ' 56 Therefore, there had been no conspiracy.
The sole decision-maker rule is sensible when one person makes
joint decisions for related corporations. The rule focuses on control,
rather than on formal corporate organization. The applicability of
Md. 1975), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp.
1321, 1325-26, n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1971).
51. Kiefer-Stewart Co., 340 U.S. at 215.
52. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 54-55; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note
9, at 37-38; Note, supra note 9, at 735 ("the elements of behavior that constitute 'hold-
ing out' have never been precisely delineated").
53. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
54. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 760, 767 n.12
(D. Md. 1983) ("as a matter of law a 'one-man show' exception exists to the general rule
of intra-enterprise conspiracy"); see, e.g., Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement
Co., 94 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Md. 1950), afd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951); Harvey v.
Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. 589 F.2d at 451.
56. Id. at 457.
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the rule is limited, however, to those situations where one person
owns, controls, and makes the decisions-a rare occurrence, because
most corporations have many shareholders and decisions are usually
made by a board of directors.
The Third Party Restraint Test
Courts have also used the third party restraint test to limit the
scope of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.5 7 The rule distin-
guishes between conduct aimed at outside competitors, which would
be actionable, and concerted action directed only at subsidiaries or
affiliates themselves, which would not. The courts which employ this
approach, however, have failed to provide clear guidelines to deter-
mine when conduct should be considered internal or external.58 Ad-
ditionally, commentators criticize this rule biecause almost any
change aimed only at the subsidiaries will have an effect on outside
competitors as well. 5 9 Moreover, the basis of the rule appears ques-
tionable because it focuses on the impact of the conduct of the affili-
ated corporations, and not on whether the corporations are capable
of conspiring. 0
The All The Facts Test
The most widely used limitation on the intra-enterprise doctrine
has been the all the facts test."' Under this doctrine, courts look be-
yond separate incorporation and examine all the facts and circum-
stances regarding the relationship of the corporations in question to
determine whether they are acting as independent entities capable of
conspiring. All relevant evidence is taken into consideration, but de-
cisions using this test have set forth a list of the most significant
relevant factors. These include the degree of cooperative produc-
tion,62 shared business solicitation, 3 joint labor negotiations,
57. This test has been invoked in two district court rulings: REA Express, Inc. v.
Alabama Gr. S.R.R., 427 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Sower-
ine v. United States, 431 U.S. 961 (1977), Thomsen v. Western Electric Co., 512 F.
Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 680 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 991 (1982).
58. See cases cited supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 9, at 213; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 9, at48-49.60. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 51-52, n.156.
61. The test has- been used by the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. E.g.,
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-19 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581,
588 (8th Cir. 1981). For a more extensive list of cases, see Handler & Smart, supra note
7, at 55.
62. Knutson v. Daily Review Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 802 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
63. Las Vegas Sun, 610 F.2d at 618.
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shared locations, 5 consolidated corporate tax returns,6 6 common cor-
porate logo,6 7 shared research and development resources,68 and in-
tra-enterprise exchange of personnel. 69
The first case to use this approach was Knutson v. Daily Review,
Inc."° The defendants, a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary,
published five newspapers. After independent distributors challenged
provisions in the dealer agreement, the defendants replaced the inde-
pendent distributors with employee distributors. The independent
distributors brought an action alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade
between the parent and subsidiary. The Ninth Circuit found that,
although the parent and subsidiary were separately incorporated,
they were a single entity. The court held that "[t]he relationship be-
tween them far exceeds mere ownership [by the parent] of the sub-
sidiary's stock, and therefore, this is not a case of parent and inde-
pendent subsidiary, but of a single business unit separated only by
the technicality of separate incorporation. 7 1 This decision has been
followed by many courts in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits .7 2
This approach is an analytical improvement over other tests used
by the circuits because it focuses on the factual indicia of subsidiary
autonomy to measure the separateness of parents and subsidiaries.
Additionally, the all the facts test is less likely to be manipulated by
defendants than the absolute rule, because the factors on which the
courts appraisal will rely are established long before the prospect of
litigation arises.73
Nevertheless, the all the facts test has also been justifiably criti-
cized by the commentators.7 4 The major criticism involves the confu-
sion created by the courts in their opinions concerning the important
factors bearing upon this theory. While the courts who use this ap-
proach have mentioned many criteria 7  that should be examined to
64. Thomsen, 680 F.2d at 1267.
65. See Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F.
Supp. 841, 859 (N.D. Cal. 1979), a ffd sub nom, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. Thomsen, 680 F.2d at 1266.
67. Id. at 1267.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 548 F.2d at 795.
71. Id. at 802.
72. See cases cited supra note 61.
73. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 60; Comment, Intraenterprise
Antitrust Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1751-52; Note, supra note 9, at 671-73.
75. See cases cited supra notes 61-66.
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determine separateness, no court has assigned relative weights to the
different factors. This vagueness regarding the importance of each
factor makes the outcome of each case quite difficult to determine,7 6
and creates uncertainty for corporations because there are no general
guidelines under which to operate without fear of a section 1 viola-
tion.7 7 The more control a parent imposes on a subsidiary under this
test, the less exposure there will be to a section 1 violation. Con-
versely, increased delegation of authority increases that exposure.
This rule, therefore, forces parent corporations to maintain control
over their subsidiaries that may not otherwise be required or desired
in the course of regular operations, in order to avoid section 1
liability.78
COPPERWELD CORP. V. INDEPENDENCE TUBE CORP.
The Supreme Court once again dealt with the single entity ques-
tion in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp..9 In 1972,
Copperweld purchased Regal Tube Company from Lear Siegler,
Inc.8 0 The sale agreement contained a non-competition clause which
prohibited Lear Siegler and its subsidiaries from competing with Re-
gal in the United States for five years. Although Regal had been
operated as an unincorporated division by Lear Siegler, Copperweld
decided to incorporate Regal as a wholly owned subsidiary to avoid
double taxation."' Regal continued its manufacturing operations in
Chicago but moved its corporate headquarters to Copperweld head-
quarters in Pittsburgh.
Shortly after the sale, David Grohne, president of Regal while it
was a division of Lear Siegler, and who became a Lear Siegler of-
ficer after the sale to Copperweld, formed a new corporation known
as Independence Tube Corporation. In December 1972, Indepen-
dence contracted with the Yoder Company to build a plant.8 2 Cop-
perweld and Regal learned of Grohne's plans and also discovered
that the non-competition clause did not bind Grohne. On advice
from counsel, Copperweld and Regal sent letters threatening legal
action to Yoder and other potential suppliers to protect the "know-
76. Factfinders face an undifferentiated, unranked list of elements which are used
to determine corporate integration.
77. Enterprises attempting to operate within the confines of the Sherman Act find
it difficult to assess what conditions they must meet to avoid liability.
78. For further discussion on this point, see Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust
Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1752.
79. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
80. Regal had been operated as a wholly owned subsidiary by its original parent
who subsequently sold the company to Lear Siegler. Id. at 2734.
81. Copperweld and Regal were avoiding taxation by both Illinois and
Pennsylvania.
82. Yoder was to complete the plant by December of 1973. Id. at 2734.
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how, technical information, designs, plans, drawings, trade secrets or
inventions of Regal" which Copperweld had purchased. 3
After receiving such a letter in February 1973, Yoder terminated
its contract with Independence. Independence negotiated a contract
with another tubing mill manufacturer and the resulting plant went
into operation in September 1974, nine months later than if Yoder
had built the plant as agreed. Independence sued Copperweld, Re-
gal, and Yoder, claiming that they had violated section 1.
At trial, the jury found that Copperweld and Regal, but not
Yoder, had conspired in violation of section 1. At a subsequent trial
on the issue of damages, the jury awarded two and a half million
dollars against Copperweld and Regal on the section 1 claim. These
damages were then trebled. 4 Attorney's fees and costs were also
awarded. 85
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that
Copperweld had conspired with its wholly owned subsidiary. The
court applied the all the facts test it* had developed in previous
casess6 and concluded that the jury was properly instructed and thus
could reasonably have found that Copperweld and Regal had vio-
lated section 1 by conspiring to prevent Independence from entering
the steel tubing market.
The circuit court noted, however, that there were difficulties with
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. The court observed that in
"a purely formal sense" a conspiracy was possible, because "there
are two corporations and hence two actors," but, "as a practical
matter there may be little difference between a wholly owned subsid-
iary and a fully integrated division."8" The court also acknowledged
the almost universal academic criticism of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine, 88 but deemed itself constrained by previous Su-
preme Court decisions.""
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court was presented with
several alternatives in Copperweld 0 In its opinion, the Court dis-
83. Counsel advised this to prevent third parties from developing a reliance inter-
est which a court might not want to disturb later. Id. at 2374.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2735.
86. Copperweld challenged the instructions given by the district court since they
included nine factors, while the test developed by earlier circuit cases had used five fac-
tors. Independence Tube Corp., 691 F.2d at 318-19.
87. 691 F.2d at 316.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 104 S. Ct. at 2731. As one commentator pointed out, the Supreme Court had
1257
cussed at some length each of its prior decisions in which the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine9' had been invoked. It reasoned that
the doctrine was always an alternative holding92 except in Kiefer-
Stewart, and even that case could have been decided identically on
different grounds. 3 The Court noted that "while this Court has pre-
viously seemed to acquiesce in the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine, it has never explored or analyzed in detail the justifications for
such a rule."' 94 The Court then reversed the court of appeals decision
in a five to three opinion written by Chief Justice Burger. In the
process, the Court created a new rule, holding that a parent and a
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each other
for the purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.95
The principal focus of the Copperweld opinion was on the distinc-
tion between unilateral and concerted activity, the former being gov-
erned by section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the latter falling under
section 1.86 The Court, agreeing with many commentators, noted
that the central criticism of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
is that it "gives undue significance to the fact that a subsidiary is
separately incorporated and thereby treats as the concerted activity
of two entities what is really unilateral behavior flowing from deci-
sions of single enterprise. ' '17
The Court found that the Seventh Circuit's all the facts test was
inadequate because, realistically, a parent and a wholly owned sub-
sidiary always have a unity of interest or a common design. In effect,
these organizations share a common purpose whether or not the par-
ent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary, because "the parent may
four choices in Copperweld. It could: "(1) accede to the Seventh Circuit's standard, (2)
reject it as inconsistent with the Court's own separate incorporation standard, (3) adopt
an entirely new standard, or (4) repudiate altogether the doctrine of intraenterprise con-
spiracy." Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy, supra note 9, at 1734-35.
91. These decisions included United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218
(1947); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). For a brief discussion of these
cases, see supra note 30.
92. The Court felt that in each of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases,
with the exception of Kiefer-Stewart, the defendant's activities were such that the doc-
trine was not necessary to the decision. For example, the Court reasoned that in Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 218, the defendant's original acquisitions of its affiliated companies
were the result of an illegal conspiracy and, therefore, any post-acquisition conduct vio-
lated the Sherman Act. Thus, the Court could have used this alternative reasoning to
reach the same result. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 2739. Noting that Kiefer-Stewart strayed beyond the Yellow
Cab holding, the Court pointed out that the same result would now be justified on the
ground that the subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other than the plaintiff.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2745.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
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assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the
parent's best interest."98 The Court believed the Seventh Circuit's
approach measured the separateness of the parent and subsidiary;99
however, if a subsidiary is wholly owned, "these factors are not suffi-
cient to describe a separate economic entity for purposes of the Sher-
man Act."100
Several points emerge from the Copperweld holding. The Court
appears ready to look beyond the legal formalities of separate incor-
poration to the economic realities of business structures before deter-
mining what constitutes a single entity. The Court realized that sep-
arate incorporation does not alter the unity of legal and economic
interests, and does not make wholly owned subsidiaries independent
in any meaningful antitrust sense. Additionally, the Court recog-
nized that the economic goal of increased profits for the larger eco-
nomic enterprise is the same regardless of how the enterprise decides
to structure itself.
The new rule seems consistent with the statutory scheme of the
Sherman Act and antitrust laws generally. Section 1 is concerned
with collaborative practices in which economic resources of one en-
tity are joined with those of another. In applying other provisions of
the antitrust laws, the courts and enforcement agencies have recog-
nized that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary con-
stitute a single economic entity.101
The issue of when affiliated corporations constitute a single entity
remains unsettled after Copperweld. While the Court has demon-
strated its concern for defining a single entity in more economically
realistic terms, it avoided determining if and when affiliated corpora-
tions will constitute a single entity.10 2 This issue may soon become a
critical question in the lower courts.10 3 Given the Supreme Court's
new, realistic view, how should the lower courts determine when af-
98. Id. at 2742.
99. Id. at 2742 n.18.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
102. "We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a par-
ent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be
liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own." 104 S.
Ct. at 2740.
103. It is fair to presume that in the near future affiliated corporate defendants
charged with section 1 violations, noting the new posture of the Court, will begin to
defend on the ground that they are a single entity. The lower courts will then be forced
to decide this issue.
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filiated corporations constitute a single entity? The Supreme Court
has not, as yet, set forth explicit guidelines for the lower courts to
follow.' 04
The circuits, when confronted with affiliated corporate situations,
may apply the various divergent tests, discussed above, that have
been used to define a single entity in intra-enterprise conspiracy
cases, 10 5 or may develop alternative tests. In any event, it is valuable
to examine two alternative tests, one that has been used outside the
United States and another that has been suggested by interested
authorities.
THE COMMON MARKET APPROACH
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, created the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), or European Common Market.106 The
Treaty has antitrust provisions very similar to sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.10 7 The EEC, like the United States, has had to estab-
lish methods or tests to determine what constitutes a single entity for
antitrust purposes. It is, therefore, useful to examine the approaches
used by the EEC.
The EEC seeks to integrate ten national economies into a single
economic community. One of the essential elements of a free econ-
omy is the existence of unrestrained competition. To maintain vigor-
ous competition, the EEC has specific rules which regulate, and pro-
vide sanctions for, agreements or practices that have an adverse
effect on competition within the EEC. The EEC Commission and the
Court of Justice are the two entities that compel the observance of
the Treaty. The Commission is an administrative arm in charge of
enforcing the Treaty, while the Court of Justice ensures the obser-
104. While the Court offered no explicit guidance, the Copperweld opinion implic-
itly signals to the lower courts that they should make their single entity determinations
mindful of the realities of business relationships.
105. See supra notes 33-77 and accompanying text.
106. The European Economic Community (EEC), or European Common Market,
was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, signed on March 25, 1957, and effective
on January i, 1958. There are currently ten member countries. The original six member
countries are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and The Netherlands. Three more countries became members in 1973: the United King-
dom, Ireland and Denmark. Greece became the tenth member in 1981. The general ob-
jective of the EEC is the creation of a union of European states solidified by common
economic purposes. The specific objectives of the EEC are harmonious expansion, greater
economic and financial stability, a faster rise in the standard of living, and closer rela-
tions between the members. The Treaty provides that the EEC will be of unlimited dura-
tion and have its own personality and legal capacity. Four institutions carry out the gov-
erning tasks of the EEC: an Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Commission, and a
Court of Justice. For a more extensive discussion of the structure of the EEC, see D.
BAROUNOS, D. HALL, AND J. JAMES, EEC ANTI-TRUST LAW (1975); W. ALEXANDER,
THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (1973).
107. Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty were patterned after sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and generally have the same scope.
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vance of the law by interpreting and applying the Treaty. Both of
these bodies issue decisions applying the Treaty.108
The basic competition provisions of the EEC are article 85109 and
article 86110 of the Treaty. Article 86 prohibits any "improper ad-
vantage" of dominant market position.1 ' Article 85 prohibits "any
agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of en-
terprises and concerted practices which are likely to affect trade be-
tween the Member States and which have as their object or result
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market." ' 2
An agreement between at least two undertakings is a prerequisite
to the application of article 85. It follows that a single undertaking,
unless it is dominant and therefore subject to article 86, can conduct
its business as it sees fit, although the result may be to restrain com-
petition. For purposes of article 85, an "undertaking" is identified
with the legal entity owning it; hence, in a group of companies there
can be as many undertakings as there are members of the group.
Conversely, where several businesses are operated by a single com-
pany, through divisions, for example, only one undertaking exists
and article 85 does not prohibit restrictive practices within the com-
pany.1 3 Like the Sherman Act, this approach makes the formal
structure chosen by a corporation the focal point in determining
whether article 85 has been violated. Contrary to the experience in
the United States, however, this anomalous result has been mitigated
by decisions of the Commission, and judgments of the Court of
Justice.
In Re Christiani and Nielsen,"4 article 85 was held inapplicable
to a market sharing agreement between a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary. Noting the absence of competition between the
parent and subsidiary, the Commission held that article 85 does not
regulate agreements between a parent and its subsidiary because
such agreements constitute "only a distribution of tasks within a sin-
gle economic entity" and do not have as an object or result a re-
108. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
4, 155, 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
109. Id. at art. 85.
110. Id. at art. 86.
111. Id.
112. Id. at art. 85.
113. Read literally, article 85 seems to apply a form over substance approach simi-
lar to that of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
114. 1969 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 297, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. D36.
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straint of competition within the EEC.115 The Commission reasoned
that although the subsidiary had a legal personality of its own, it was
in fact economically and physically'1 6 an integral part of the parent
company. Therefore, the agreement allocating markets had neither
the object nor the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting
competition. 117
In Re Kodak"8 the parent adopted uniform sales conditions for its
subsidiaries operating within the EEC. The Commission found that
the uniform conditions were outside the scope of article 85.119 It rea-
soned that where subsidiaries are wholly subservient to their parent
company, and the latter in fact exercises its power of control by issu-
ing precise instructions to them, it is impossible for them to act inde-
pendently. 20 Therefore, according to the Commission, internal ar-
rangements ensuing from parental directives are not the result of an
agreement or concerted practice.121
In another case, Bequelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export
SA, 122 a parent transferred part of its sole distribution rights to a
subsidiary. The Court of Justice held that article 85 prohibits agree-
ments whose object or effect is to restrict competition. The court
found, however, that an exclusive distribution contract, which trans-
ferred distribution rights from a parent to a subsidiary, did not have
the object or effect o restricting competition. 23 This decision was
based on the fact th it the subsidiary lacked economic autonomy,
though it technically had its own legal identity.
The Court of Justice initiated a new approach in Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries, Ltd. v. EC Commission. 124 The court, which in its
previous decisions had focused on whether competition was affected
or on whether an agreement was present, stated that the key inquiry
was whether a subsidiary has autonomy in determining its conduct
115. Id. at D39. Although the result of the case is correct, some commentators are
critical of the reasoning of the Commission because it seems to require competition be-
tween the parent and subsidiary before article 85 is violated. See D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL,
& J. JAMES, supra note 106, at 69; W. ALEXANDER, supra note 106, at 13.
116. Re Christiani & Nelson, 169 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 297, 8 Common Mkt.
L.R. at D39.
117. Id.
118. 1970 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 24, 9 Common Mkt. L.R. D19.
119. Id. at D24.
120. Id. at D21.
121. Commentators have criticized the holding, because the Commission focused
on a lack of an "agreement" between the parties, while a better rationale would have
been that there was only one economic unit and therefore, only one enterprise. See H.
SMIT & P. HERZOG. THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY at 3-97, 3-98
(1981).
122. 1972 E. Comm. CT. J. Rep. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81.
123. This decision may be criticized for the same reasons as Christiani and Niel-
son. See supra note I 11.
124. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
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within the market. Under this approach if the parent exercises con-
trol over the subsidiary and the subsidiary lacks self-determination
in its market conduct, even though it is legally a separate entity,
article 85 is inapplicable to the relationship between the two, as they
form a single economic unit. 25
The Court of Justice has continued to utilize this approach in sub-
sequent cases. The court has ruled that the conduct of a subsidiary
may be imputed to its parent company, regardless of the legal per-
sonality of the subsidiary if the former is unable to determine its
market conduct autonomously but rather follows instructions of its
parent.'26 Similarly, the court has held that article 85 is not con-
cerned with agreements or concerted practices between undertakings
belonging to the same concern and having the status of parent com-
pany and subsidiary. This is true, however, only if the undertakings
form an economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real free-
dom to determine its course of action in the market. 27
This current approach of the EEC on the question of what consti-
tutes a single entity or undertaking is to examine the economic rela-
tionship of the corporations in question. The degree of economic de-
pendence existing among them, rather than the question of legal
personality, is the determining factor in analyzing whether or not
two entities exist within the meaning of article 85. Intra-enterprise
conspiracy has not been a problem in EEC antitrust law due to this
economic, rather than legalistic, approach. The test, established by
the Court of Justice to determine whether a single entity is present,
is to ask whether one company has the power of control over another
and actually exercises that power. If both answers are affirmative,
the companies constitute a single entity.
The EEC test looks past the form over substance approach tradi-
tionally followed by the Supreme Court and many of the circuits in
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases.128 The EEC examines the
economic reality behind a particular factual situation before deter-
mining whether single or multiple entities are present for purposes of
its antitrust provisions. In this sense, the test can be viewed as an
125. Id. at 567-70. Similarly, the conduct of a subsidiary can be attributed to the
parent with which it forms a single entity, for article 86 purposes.
126. See Re Continental Can, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 11 Common Mkt.
L.R. D 11; Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SPA and Commercial Solvents Corpora-
tion v. EC Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309.
127. Centra Farm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 480.
128. See supra notes 30, 33-49, 57-60 and accompanying text.
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improvement over many of the circuit tests.
The EEC test is, however, very similar to the all the facts test
used by several circuits. 29 Both tests look beyond separate incorpo-
ration and examine how the corporations are in fact operating. Addi-
tionally, each standard addresses the question of control in operation.
The EEC approach, therefore, is subject to the same criticism as the
all the facts test-in some instances, it may require parents to main-
tain more control over subsidiaries than would otherwise be neces-
sary in the course of normal operations. 130
While the all the facts and EEC tests are similar, it is important
to note that they are distinguishable. A relevant distinction between
the two is the evidentiary analysis utilized. Under the all the facts
approach, a broad range of evidence is examined. 131 Almost any evi-
dence which will support the proposition that the corporations in
question are separate entities may be introduced.132 On the other
hand, the EEC standard examines only the evidence which goes to
the issue of effective management control.' 33 The EEC court must
first determine that one company has the power to control another
company; the examination then shifts to whether control has in fact
been exercised. The scope of the examination is therefore limited to
analyzing how management procedures and decisions (long term,
short term, and day to day) are resolved. Hence, extrinsic evidence,
such as whether the corporations have a common corporate logo and
conduct joint labor negotiations, while clearly within the ambit of
the all the facts test, 34 is beyond the scope of the EEC examination.
COMMON CONTROL TEST
Another suggested standard for determining whether affiliated
corporations constitute a single entity is the common control test.
The Justice Department, in an amicus curiae brief filed in Cop-
perweld, 3 5 urged the Supreme Court to treat commonly controlled
corporations as a single entity for purposes of Sherman Act. This
approach views ownership as the determinant of control. Therefore,
majority ownership is treated the same as complete ownership. In
the majority ownership situation, a single entity for section 1 pur-
poses is assumed. Under this view, not only, are a parent and wholly
129. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. See also Independence Tube
Corp., 691 F.2d at 331-32 (where the circuit court affirmed the instructions given by the
district court to the jury which included nine factors to be considered).
132. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
135. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14
n.29, Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2731.
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owned subsidiary commonly controlled corporations, but so are two
wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent. Additionally, common
control is presumed where parent ownership exceeds fifty percent of
a subsidiary's stock.
A corporation may decide to operate through separately incorpo-
rated subsidiaries and grant them a considerable degree of opera-
tional independence. In some cases, several subsidiaries may appear
to compete with one another or with their parent. Despite this ap-
pearance, however, corporations under common control cannot prop-
erly be viewed as independent units or competitors in an economic or
antitrust context.13 6 The relationship between the subsidiaries will be
the result of management decisions by the parent company. 137 The
controlling entity will determine the extent of competition or opera-
tional independence of each subordinate unit, based on its conclu-
sions about how to maximize the profits of the aggregate
enterprise.138
A common control approach would have two principal benefits.
First, it would be consistent with the general antitrust enforcement
scheme. In applying other provisions of the antitrust laws, courts and
enforcement agencies recognize that the formal corporate structure
of single economic entities is irrelevant to issues of anticompetitive
effect. For example, parent corporations and separately incorporated
subsidiaries are considered as one for the purpose of determining
market power in section 2 cases. 39 Subsidiaries are also analyzed in
determining whether an acquisition results in such an increase in
concentration of market power that it violates section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.140 Additionally, under Federal Trade Commission regula-
tions implementing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976,141 an acquisition made through a separate subsidiary is
subject to the pre-merger reporting requirements of the Act to the
136. The fact that a parent corporation and its controlled subsidiaries are held out
as, or appear to the public to be, competitors does not provide an antitrust policy ration-
ale to treat them as independent economic decision-makers. Basing liability on a "hold-
ing out" theory suggests that some misrepresentation causes injury to the public.
137. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 267-81 (1978) (discussion
of market competition and structure).
138. For an economic analysis of decision making by commonly controlled firms,
see Hirshleifer, Economics of the Divisionalized Firm, 30 J. Bus. 96 (1957).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 567 (1966); United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1345-46 (D.D.C. 1981).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
141. Id. at § 18(a).
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same extent as an acquisition made directly by the parent. 142 In ad-
dition, the regulations define as a single "person" the parent entity
and all entities it controls directly or indirectly. 143 These practices
are consistent with the principle, articulated by the Supreme Court,
that the antitrust laws look to economic substance rather than
form.144
Second, the common control approach would promote judicial effi-
ciency by allowing courts to automatically find that a single entity
exists when one corporation owns a majority of another corporation's
stock. Any time a parent owns fifty-one percent or more of a subsidi-
ary, courts would assume that they constitute a single entity, rather
than engaging in a factual analysis and employing one of the many
circuit court tests necessary to define a single entity.145
On the other hand, the principal weakness of the common control
approach would be its narrowness. It would only be effective where
the affiliated corporate relationship is that of a parent which is the
majority owner of a subsidiary. It would be unusable where one cor-
poration owns less than a majority of another corporation's stock but
for some reason exercises effective control over the latter. The com-
mon control approach, therefore, is an incomplete answer to the
larger question of how to determine what constitutes a single entity
in various business structures.
142. Id.
143. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(l) (1984). Mergers of commonly controlled corpora-
tions will not lessen competition because they do not alter control. For this reason, crea-
tion of, or merger of, wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent are expressly ex-
empted from the premerger notification rules of the commission. See id. at §§ 802-30.
144. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 46-47
(1977); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933).
145. In a brief supporting the petitioner in Copperweld, the Canadian Chamber of
Commerce argued that a common control rule would be particularly appropriate with
regard to the relationships between affiliated United States and foreign corporations. See
Brief for Canadian Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). In many foreign
countries, government policy concerning foreign investment directly and substantially af-
fects the structure and management of affiliated corporations. See, e.g., PRICE
WATERHOUSE & CO., INVESTMENT POLICIES IN SEVENTY-THREE COUNTRIES: SECOND
ANNUAL SURVEY (1982) (fifty-eight of seventy-three countries surveyed imposed some
form of ownership restrictions). Corporations seeking to operate within foreign countries
frequently must enter into agreements concerning the ownership, management, and oper-
ations within the country. See, e.g., Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA),
which in general requires notification and government approval of both the establishment
of new business and the acquisition of existing businesses in Canada by foreigners. Act of
Dec. 12, 1973, ch. 63, 1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619, amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1977, ch.
52, S.128(2), 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 1193, and Act of June 29, 1982, ch. 107, S. 63,
1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3131.
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A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Policy Considerations
Ideally, developing a standard to determine whether affiliated cor-
porations constitute a single entity for section 1 purposes should be
accomplished with the policy of the antitrust laws in mind. The
Sherman Act was intended to preserve and promote competition.146
The function of section 1 within the Act is to promote independent
centers of decision-making. To accomplish this, certain contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies that restrain trade are declared to be
illegal. 147 If it appears that competition is restrained by a contract,
combination, or conspiracy, section 1 should apply when entities are
involved that from an economic point of view, are distinct, although
perhaps not unrelated.
Any proposed test should have at least two goals beyond being
consistent with the intent of the antitrust scheme. First, given the
various factual situations arising in complex business relationships,
the approach must have the flexibility to determine in each instance
whether affiliated corporations constitute a single entity. In making
this determination, any useful test must go beyond legal formalities
and examine whether the corporations in question are distinct par-
ticipants in the economic process, each capable of determining its
own market conduct. Second, the test must be simple to apply and
produce consistent results.
The Proposed Test
The approach advocated by this Comment is a hybrid test, com-
bining common control and effective management control tests.
Neither test has been used explicitly by the courts in the United
States.1 48 While this approach combines the two tests, each test may
be considered a distinct portion or tier of the hybrid approach, hav-
ing mutually exclusive areas of application. In those situations where
one corporation owns more than fifty percent of the stock of another
corporation, the common control tier of the test would apply. Where
one corporation owns less than fifty percent of the stock of another
146. See CONG. REC. S2456-64 (1980) (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890) (remarks by Sen.
Sherman).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
148. But cf. Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section I of the Sherman
Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717, 739 n.123 (1977) (support for an
approach similar to an effective management control standard can be found in several
cases).
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but the holding corporation' 49 claims for some reason to be a single
entity with the distributing corporation, 5 1 the effective management
control tier of the test would be utilized. For illustrative purposes,
assume that charges of section 1 violations have been filed against
corporate defendants in each of the five hypothetical business rela-
tionships presented in the introduction to this Comment.
In the first hypothetical, the parent and wholly owned subsidiary
situation, the Copperweld case provides a definitive rule of law. 151
Nevertheless, for the purposes of examining the operation of the hy-
brid test, it will be applied to this hypothetical. Courts faced with
such a situation need only determine that the parent owns at least a
majority of the stock of the subsidiary. At that point, the examina-
tion ends; majority ownership is deemed to create common control,
thus the two corporations are a single entity for section 1 purposes.
The outcome of this approach is consistent with the Copperweld rul-
ing. The justifications for such an approach are generally the same
as those presented in Copperweld. 52 Further, one of the goals of the
advocated approach is to apply section 1 only where the corporations
in question are distinct participants in the economic process, each
capable of determining its own market conduct. A wholly owned
subsidiary is not capable of determining its own market conduct, be-
cause the parent can exercise control at any time, even in instances
where the subsidiary is a separate legal entity and has the freedom
to manage its own day-to-day affairs.53
In the second hypothetical situation, where a parent is the major-
ity owner of a subsidiary, courts once again need only determine that
the parent owns a majority interest. Once majority ownership is
shown, common control is assumed and the corporations are consid-
ered to be a single entity. Many of the justifications for this ap-
proach have been presented above.' Additionally, as was true with
a parent and wholly owned subsidiary, in those situations where the
parent has a majority of voting stock, the distributing subsidiary has
no real autonomy in its business conduct. The controlling entity will
determine the extent of operational independence of the subsidiary,
basing its conclusions on how to maximize the profits of the aggre-
149. For purposes of this Comment, the term "holding corporation" is used to de-
note a corporation which owns less than a majority of the stock of another corporation.
150. The term "distributing corporation" is used to denote a corporation whose
shares are held by, among others, a holding corporation, although the holding corpora-
tion owns less than a majority of the outstanding shares.
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The application of the suggested
approach is therefore moot in this situation.
152. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
153. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
154. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
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gate enterprise.'55 In other words, a subsidiary is not a separate en-
tity in relation to the parent, who controls a majority of its voting
stock, but rather, the two form an economic unit.
In the third, fourth, and fifth hypothetical situations, the effective
management control tier of the test would be applicable. It is a ques-
tion of fact whether a company in which a holding corporation does
not own a majority interest is economically independent. Courts
faced with these types of situations must engage in a two step exami-
nation.'56 First, they must determine whether the holding company
has power to control the decisions of another corporation. Second, if
the answer is affirmative,' 57 the courts then must determine whether
this power has in fact been exercised.158 If the second inquiry is also
answered affirmatively, the corporations in question should be con-
sidered a single entity.
Courts should find the first step of the examination-determining
whether the power to control exists-easily satisfied.5 9 In most situ-
ations, the scope of inquiry during this phase of the examination
should be limited to whether it is conceivable for the holding corpo-
ration to possess the power it claims. If it is, the focus should turn to
the more important second step. 60
In the second step of the examination, courts will examine the pat-
tern of decision-making within the distributing corporation to deter-
mine whether it has market autonomy. The courts will analyze how
long-term and short-term goals are set, how day-to-day decisions are
made, whether standard operating practices are determined by the
holding corporation, and how the company makes decisions in rou-
tine and emergency situations.' 6' Distributing corporations which en-
155. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
156. This two step process is quite similar to the approach used by the EEC.
157. If the answer is negative, there are two independent centers of economic deci-
sion-making. If the corporations combine or conspire to restrain trade in some way, sec-
tion I should apply, because it declares illegal collaborative practices in which the eco-
nomic resources under one source of control are joined with those of another.
158. This, of course, would require the court to perform its fact-finding function.
159. Defendants invoking the single entity defense would have the burden of proof
in both steps of this examination. There are two reasons which warrant this approach.
First, the burden in meeting the first step of the examination is quite trivial. Second, the
defendants are in a much better position to obtain the relevant data needed to determine
whether control has been exercised.
160. If it is entirely impossible for the holding corporation to possess any power of
control over the distributing corporation, the corporations should be considered separate
entities and subject to section 1 liability.
161. While a wide array of data concerning decision-making will be examined,
other entrinsic factors which would be considered in the all the facts test are clearly
beyond the scope of this test.
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joy enough autonomy to determine their own long-term goals and to
operate without interference from the holding corporation will be
deemed separate entities for section 1 purposes. Because the holding
corporation does not control either the long-term planning or day-to-
day operation of the distributing corporation, each is indeed a dis-
tinct entity in the economic process. A distributing corporation
should not be deemed a distinct entity, however, simply because it
has been granted some operational decision-making responsibilities.
The holding corporation may allow the distributing corporation to
determine day-to-day operational decisions and even set short-term
goals, but within a framework of broad long-term goals established
by the holding corporation. In these instances, the two corporations
are not distinct participants in the economic process because the
holding corporation is in reality determining the market conduct of
both.
In the third hypothetical, the holding corporation owns less than a
majority of shares in the distributing corporation, but owns a large
enough block to claim effective control. Plaintiffs who initiate anti-
trust suits in these situations will attempt to demonstrate that the
commercial decisions of the distributing corporation are reached by
its governing body, fully independent of the other corporation, and
without regard to its share holdings or rights of control. On the other
hand, defendants will attempt to prove that the holding corporation
has the power to control the decisions of the distributing corporation
and that this power has in fact been exercised. As a practical matter,
if the block of shares owned by the holding corporation is large, ap-
proaching forty to fifty percent, the possible existence of power to
control is easily seen. Therefore, this question will play a less impor-
tant role. Instead, the focus of the examination will be on the more
difficult question of whether control has in fact been exercised.
In the fourth hypothetical, only a small percentage of the stock of
the distributing corporation is owned by the holding corporation, but,
because of widespread public holdings, effective control is possible.
Once again, the parties to the suit will be making the contentions
outlined above and the court will be employing the same examina-
tion. Determining whether the holding corporation has the power to
control will take on added importance in these instances. Instead of
concluding summarily that this power exists, the courts must care-
fully review the relationship between the corporations to determine
whether it is conceivable that the holding corporation exercises con-
trol, given its limited shareholdings. Only after careful examination
of this question should they examine the decision-making procedures
of the distributing corporation.
The fifth and final hypothetical, where a corporation may exercise
control over another corporation through loan or licensing agree-
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ments, presents the most difficult circumstance for making a deter-
mination of whether two corporations are a single entity.162 Courts in
these situations will need to conduct a scrupulous examination of the
agreements which represent the potential basis of the power to con-
trol. Initially, it would seem that a corporation would never enter
into an agreement by which it relinquishes its autonomy to another
corporation; however, this does in fact occur. For example, a corpo-
ration with a large outstanding debt that cannot meet its obligations
as they come due, may solicit a bank or other corporation to pay off
the debt and become its creditor, usually with the understanding
that the new creditor will control the direction of the debtor.
After determining that the power to control the debtor corporation
has been passed to a creditor, the courts must examine the decision-
making procedures of the debtor to determine if the creditor has ex-
ercised control. If it is determined that the creditor corporation has
exercised control, there is in reality only one source of decision-mak-
ing. Therefore, because there is only one true economic participant,
the corporations should be considered a single entity for section 1
purposes.
Advantages of the Suggested Approach
The advocated approach fulfills the goals of a proposed test as set
forth above. First, the test is flexible enough that it can be effectively
applied to any type of business relationship to determine whether the
parties constitute a single entity. Second, the approach is easy to
apply and will produce consistent results because it limits the num-
ber and types of facts considered in determining the capacity of the
actors to conspire. Courts need only apply one of the two tiers of the
test, depending on the facts. Third, the approach has a sound eco-
nomic basis. The goal of the test is to determine how many distinct
participants capable of autonomous market conduct are involved. Its
premise is that every autonomous participant should be considered a
separate entity for purposes of section 1.
This approach is an improvement over the tests currently used in
the circuits to define a single entity. It improves on the absolute
rule163 because it looks beyond the legal formality of separate incor-
poration to matters of economic substance in determining whether
the plurality needed to violate section 1 exists. This focus on eco-
162. The parties involved will make the same contentions as they would in the
third hypothetical. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
163. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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nomic substance is also its major advancement over the holding out
as competitors""' and third party restraint 6 5 tests, which focus on
the impact of corporate behavior on outsiders instead of on whether
the corporations are capable of conspiring. Additionally, the ap-
proach is an improvement over the all the facts 6' test, because it
recognizes the economic reality of common control in parent and
majority owned subsidiary situations. Moreover, where control is dif-
ficult to determine from ownership, this test limits the number and
type of facts considered to only those which reflect the decision-mak-
ing process.
The standard advocated also represents an improvement over ap-
plication of the common control 6 7 and effective management con-
trol 68 approaches as alternatives. Because the test utilizes both, it
has the advantages of each and, correspondingly, fewer weaknesses.
The advantage of this test over a common control approach is its
flexibility; it may be employed in examining any possible business
relationship, while a common control approach is only useful in a
parent-subsidiary situation. It is an improvement over the effective
management control approach because it recognizes the economic re-
ality that commonly controlled corporations constitute a single
entity.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote and protect compe-
tition.' 9 The goal of section 1 of the Act is to promote independent
centers of decision-making by declaring combinations in restraint of
trade illegal.' 70 While the Supreme Court has traditionally articu-
lated the principle that antitrust laws look to economic substance
rather than form,' 7 ' its past decisions were often based on artificial
legal formalities. The Court thwarted its own efforts, in effect, by
creating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, which emphasized
the structure of an enterprise and ignored its actual substance. 7 2
The circuits, forced to operate within the vaguely articulated con-
fines of the doctrine, developed various tests, each with inherent
weaknesses, to discern what constitutes a single entity within the
scope of the doctrine.
164. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
169. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
171. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 46-47
(1977); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933).
172. 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2743 (1984).
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In Copperweld,17 3 the Supreme Court demonstrated its desire to
look beyond legal formalities to economic realities when determining
whether affiliated corporations constitute a single entity. Accord-
ingly, the circuits must now embody this economic approach in their
determination of what will constitute a single entity. Unfortunately,
the tests used by the circuit courts are constrained within the scope
of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. These courts must now
either modify their old tests or develop new ones.
To create a sensible resolution to the single entity issue, the tests
currently used by the circuits should be abandoned and replaced by
a new approach. The hybrid test advocated, which goes beyond the
legal formalities of separate incorporation, is sensitive to modern
business realities. Additionally, the test is judicially efficient, where
majority ownership exists, because it recognizes the economic reality
of common control and presumes a single entity. Moreover, it is fact
sensitive in those situations where there is less than majority owner-
ship but control nevertheless exists, because it examines whether one
company has the power to control another and actually exercises
that power. These aspects of the test make it superior to the others
examined. Without the adoption of a realistic approach, the circuits
will continue to use the same tests based on theories created before
Copperweld - tests that have been unable to develop a single entity
definition that is both theoretically and practically sound.
THOMAS W. MCNAMARA
173. Id. at 2731.
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